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A new horizontal time metric, Time to Protected Zone, is proposed for use in the
Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems equipped by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This
time metric has three advantages over the currently adopted time metric, modified tau:
it corresponds to a physical event, it is linear with time, and it can be directly used to
prioritize intruding aircraft. The protected zone defines an area around the UAS that can
be a function of each intruding aircraft’s surveillance measurement errors. Even with its
advantages, the Time to Protected Zone depends explicitly on encounter geometry and may
be more sensitive to surveillance sensor errors than modified tau. To quantify its sensitivity,
simulation of 972 encounters using realistic sensor models and a proprietary fusion tracker
is performed. Two sensitivity metrics, the probability of time reversal and the average
absolute time error, are computed for both the Time to Protected Zone and modified tau.
Results show that the sensitivity of the Time to Protected Zone is comparable to that of
modified tau if the dimensions of the protected zone are adequately defined.
Nomenclature
Dmod incremental distance modifier
HMD horizontal miss distance
Pr probability of time reversal
R0 radius of disk inside a protected zone
Rc characteristic range for alerting
h altitude difference
r˙ relative (horizontal) velocity vector
r relative (horizontal) position vector
r range
r˙ range rate
tcpa time to the horizontal closest point of approach
tpz time to Protected Zone
v relative speed, magnitude of the r˙ vector
vc characteristic relative speed
x horizontal coordinate on the collision plane
y vertical coordinate on the collision plane
τmod modified tau
|∆|avg average absolute error of a time metric
∆H characteristic size of the additional buffer zone
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∆H
0 benchmark ∆H
σH standard deviation of HMD as a result of surveillance errors
σb standard deviation of bearing measurement
σp standard deviation of position measurement
σr standard deviation of range measurement
σr˙ standard deviation of range rate measurement
σv standard deviation of speed measurement
( )∗ threshold
I. Introduction
Successful development and validation of performance standards for Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems
serve as a crucial step for the integration of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National
Airspace System (NAS). A DAA system provides alerts and guidance to keep a UAS “Well Clear” of other
aircraft.1,2 In the United States, a significant number of simulation tests as well as flight tests have been
conducted to provide supporting information for selecting an adequate definition of DAA Well Clear1,3
and requirements for the alerting performance.4–7 Prototype DAA alerting and guidance algorithms have
also been developed.8–10 The RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) Working Group I recently finished its
Phase I work at the end of 2016, and it is in the process of publishing the Minimum Operational Performance
Standards (MOPS) for DAA systems. This Phase I MOPS targets UAS capable of carrying large and high-
power sensor systems for operations in non-terminal areas. UAS in this category will be equipped with
surveillance systems including Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) in, airborne active
surveillance, an air-to-air radar, as well as a DAA tracker that processes surveillance data. Phase II work
for extending the MOPS to additional UAS categories and operations is underway.
The DAA Well Clear (DWC) zone for the UAS targeted in the Phase I MOPS is defined by thresholds
of three parameters. It does not have distinct physical boundaries because the definition depends on two
aircraft’s relative position and velocity during an encounter. Figure 1 illustrates a DWC zone. The Hori-
*
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the DWC zone.
zontal Miss Distance (HMD) represents the two aircraft’s predicted minimum horizontal distance during an
encounter assuming constant velocities (see Appendix A for a mathematical definition). The parameter h
represents the two aircraft’s current altitude difference. The time metric modified tau, τmod, is an estimated
time taken for the two aircraft to get horizontally close to each other (to be discussed in great detail below).
The thresholds, denoted by an asterisk, for the HMD, h, and τmod are 4000 ft, 450 ft, and 35 sec, respectively.
All three parameters must simultaneously fall below their respective thresholds during an encounter for the
two aircraft to violate the DWC. Alerting algorithms are designed to reduce the probability of violating DWC
to a value required by the MOPS. The MOPS describes alerting requirements in terms of probabilities and
test vectors without dictating a specific alerting algorithm. Prior research to inform the MOPS defined raw
alerts using the same definitions as the DWC but with larger thresholds to provide buffers for surveillance
uncertainties.5
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The definition of τmod is
2
τmod =
 −
r2−Dmod2
rr˙ , r > Dmod,
0, r ≤ Dmod
(1)
where r and r˙ are the horizontal range and range rate between the intruding aircraft (referred to as the
intruder) and the UAS (referred to as the ownship), respectively. The range rate is negative for closing
geometries. The positive incremental distance modifier Dmod defines the radius of a “protection” disk around
the ownship such that any intruder with a horizontal range less than Dmod is always considered “urgent”. In
this case, τmod = 0.
The time metric τmod, however, has certain limiting properties:
• It does not correspond to the time of any physical event.
• It is nonlinear with time, especially in the vicinity of the Dmod disk (see Section III for an example).
• During a multi-intruder encounter, τmod cannot be directly used to prioritize intruders.
The time metric τmod has been used by the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II equipped
by many manned aircraft.11 TCAS II is an optional component for the UAS targeted in Phase I MOPS.
Nonetheless, interoperability between a DAA system and TCAS II has been a driving force in defining the
Phase I MOPS. Ideally, a DWC zone should enclose TCAS’s alerting zone for its resolution advisory. Because
of this consideration, one argument for using τmod for the DAA DWC is for potential better interoperability
with TCAS II. The choice of τmod, however, turns out to have minimal effects due to additional differences
in TCAS II and DAA’s alerting logic such as the following:
1. TCAS II does not use the HMD consistently in its alerting logic; and
2. TCAS II’s τmod is based on 3-D range and range rates whereas the τmod defined for a DAA system is
based on horizontal range and range rate.
Another argument for using τmod for DAA systems is that the range-based τmod avoids bearing measurements
and its large measurement error. The bearing measurement errors are large in the active surveillance used
by TCAS and, therefore, τmod is a good choice for TCAS. However, for the DAA system, The bearing
measurement error is much less of an issue since the DAA system considered by the MOPS will use ADS-B
and an air-to-air radar, which both provide ten times more accurate bearing measurements than the active
surveillance used by TCAS.
This paper proposes a new, alternative horizontal time metric, the Time to Protected Zone, denoted by
tpz. This metric has three advantages over τmod: it corresponds to a physical event, it is linear with time, and
it can be used directly in prioritizing intruders during a multi-intruder encounter. For alerting purposes, the
protected zone is extended to be a function of surveillance sensor measurement errors, or surveillance errors.
Since the time metric tpz utilizes bearing measurements and, therefore, it may be too sensitive to bearing
measurement errors to be effective for alerting. To quantify sensitivities to surveillance errors, simulations
of 972 encounters are conducted using two sensitivity metrics to compare τmod and tpz. The parameters of
the encounters are organized into an encounter test matrix. The surveillance sensor errors are modeled by
Honeywell’s sensor models and proprietary sensor fusion tracker.12
The paper is organized as follows. Section II supplies additional background information and describes
the definition of tpz. Section III discusses issues about using τmod that can be overcome by tpz. Section IV
defines the sensitivity criteria for the time metrics. Section V describes the encounter test matrix and the
simulation setup. Section VI presents results and discussions. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. Time to Protected Zone
II.A. Background
The development of the MOPS for DAA systems uses a time metric to evaluate the horizontal separation
between two aircraft. A fast-approaching intruder 8 nmi away may pose a more urgent threat than a slow-
approaching intruder 3 nmi away. With a time metric threshold, the DWC does not have a fixed, physical
volume; rather it is a function of the intruder’s relative horizontal position and velocity. The time window
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considered by a DAA system covers up to 3 minutes before the aircraft reach their minimum horizontal
separation.
A commonly used time metric for pilots’ situation awareness and intruder prioritization is the time to
the Closest Point of Approach (CPA), denoted as tcpa. This time metric corresponds to a physical event
and it is linear with time. However, tcpa underestimates the urgency of an encounter when the intruder and
ownship are flying almost parallel trajectories at close range. The metric τmod mitigates this problem by
introducing a disk around the ownship with a radius of Dmod. Any intruder within the Dmod disk results in
zero τmod and it is always considered an urgent threat. However, τmod does not correspond to any physical
event. Also, τmod is non-linear with time, especially near the Dmod disk. With such behaviors, τmod cannot
be used to prioritize intruders by any criteria (See Section III).
A time metric called the Time to Entry Point has been proposed as the predicted time for the intruder
to reach the Dmod disk.
13,14 Any intruder inside the Dmod disk has a zero Time to Entry Point. This time
metric maintains the advantages of both tcpa and τmod and avoids their disadvantages. The Time to Entry
Point is left undefined if the intruder is not predicted to enter the Dmod disk, i.e., its HMD is greater than
Dmod.
II.B. Definition
This work proposes the Time to Protected Zone, tpz, which extends the Time to Entry Point metric in the
following aspects:
• The metric tpz is defined as the time to reach a protected around the ownship that does not necessarily
take the shape of a disk.
• When used for evaluating alerts, the dimensions of the protected zone can be made a function of the
surveillance errors of each intruder.
• The metric tpz is set to tcpa when the intruder is not predicted to enter the protected zone. This
provides an alerting algorithm with a continuous definition of time metric when the projected intruder
trajectory moves in and out of the protected zone in real time.
Figure 2 demonstrates the definition of the protected zone at any time during an encounter. Consider a
relative horizontal reference frame with two aircraft flying in a closing geometry. Without loss of generality,
the ownship is placed at the origin of this reference frame. The axes, xˆ and yˆ, are chosen such that the
intruder’s horizontal velocity vector relative to the ownship, r˙, points along the negative direction of the yˆ
axis. The intruder’s relative horizontal position vector from the ownship is denoted by r. This convention
of axes is called the collision plane.15,16 The ownship’s true ground heading is not used for choosing the
direction of the axes. In this reference frame, the intruder’s distance from the yˆ axis is always equal to the
HMD.
There is flexibility in the choice of the shape and dimensions of the protected zone. Its dimensions can be
made to depend on individual intruders’ surveillance errors for improved alerting performance. The example
protected zone in Figure 2 consists of a disk with radius R0 and an additional buffer zone shown in blue.
The boundary of the protected zone is shown in bold. For brevity, only the right-half plane enclosing the
intruder is shown in Figure 2 as the protected zone is symmetric about the yˆ axis. The additional buffer
zone in blue is meant to accommodate HMD errors arising from surveillance errors.
The metric tpz is defined as the time to reach the protected zone, or the time to reach the bold curve
shown in Figure 2. If the intruder’s HMD projects outside the protected zone, tpz is defined to be the time
to reach the horizontal xˆ axis, i.e., tpz = tcpa outside the protected zone. This definition ensures a smooth
change of tpz upon change of an intruder’s HMD.
With this definition of a protected zone, it follows naturally that, when defining alert criteria, the HMD
threshold, denoted as HMD∗, should be consistently set to the edge of the protected zone.
Let the surface of the protected zone be described by y = f(x). The function y is chosen such that it is
symmetric with respect to x, i.e., f(x) = f(−x), where f(x) ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, consider a case
in which the xˆ component of the intruder’s r is positive. By definition of the reference frame, x = HMD.
Therefore, an intruder will be predicted to reach the protected zone at (HMD, y). Since y is the intersection
of the the intruder’s predicted trajectory with the protected zone, it is also the distance the intruder must
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r
r.
(HMD, 0)
R0
y^
x^
Figure 2. An example protected zone consisting of a disk with a radius R0 and an additional buffer zone colored in
blue.
fly to reach the CPA. Therefore,
tpz = max
(
0, tcpa − y|r˙|
)
. (2)
Note that tcpa − y|r˙| < 0 if the intruder is already within the protected zone.
The time metric tcpa can be viewed as a special case of tpz, for which the protected zone is defined to
have zero area, i.e., y = 0 for every x.
II.C. Dimensions of the Protected Zone
In this paper, the surface, or boundary, of the protected zone is defined with the following function:
x =
√
R0
2 − y2 +
(
1− y
R0
)
∆H , 0 < y ≤ R0 and |x| ≤ R0 + ∆H (3a)
0 = y, |x| > R0 + ∆H (3b)
With this choice, the protected zone includes a R0 disk and an additional buffer outside the disk that
increases linearly as y approaches the xˆ axis, reaching ∆H at y = 0. This parameter ∆H is user-selected and
controls the size of the additional buffer zone. Solving for y in terms of x,
y =

1
1+
(
∆H
R0
)2
[
−∆HR0 (x−∆H)
2
+
√
−(x−∆H)2 +R02 + ∆H2
]
, when |x| ≤ R0 + ∆H ,
0 , when x > R0 + ∆H
(4)
II.D. Comparison of Time Metrics
All three time metrics described above, τmod, tpz, and tcpa, are symmetric,
17 meaning their values are pre-
served upon switching the ownship and the intruder’s states. Table 1 compares and contrasts the properties
of the three time metrics.
III. Limitations of Modified Tau
Figure 3 shows the progression of τmod, tpz, and tcpa during a hypothetical encounter. In this encounter,
two aircraft fly at constant velocities with a relative speed of 450 kts (closing) and an HMD of 2000 ft. The
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Table 1. Comparison of the three time metrics
Time Metric Physical Event Linear with Time Protecting against Close Intruders
tpz Yes Yes Yes
τmod No No Yes
tcpa Yes Yes No
Dmod corresponding to τmod and R0 corresponding to tpz are both set to 4000 ft. No additional buffer zone
is allocated for the protected zone corresponding to tpz, i.e., ∆H = 0. At the beginning of the encounter,
τmod is close to tcpa. The metric τmod drops more rapidly than time towards tpz as the two aircraft approach
the CPA. When R0 = Dmod, Apendix A shows that tpz ≤ {tcpa, τmod} at any predicted time during the
encounter. This is a nice property as any zone defined by a tpz threshold in this condition would enclose the
corresponding zone defined by a τmod or tcpa threshold of the same value.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Tim
e M
etr
ic (
sec
)
Time to CPA (sec)
tpzτmodtcpa
Figure 3. The three time metrics for a head-on encounter.
The Phase I MOPS defines the DWC using a τmod = 35 sec. An issue with using τmod for the DWC is
that the non-linearity of τmod adds complexity to an alerting algorithm. For example, very often an alerting
algorithm would use the predicted time to a violation of the DWC. Consider a co-altitude, head-on encounter
in which two aircraft have zero altitude difference and zero HMD. Suppose the two aircraft’s current τmod
is 70 sec, the predicted time for the two aircraft to violate the DWC, however, is not 35 sec into the future.
In fact, it must be computed by solving a quadratic equation using τmod = 35 sec in Eq. 1. Using tpz would
avoid this complexity. If the DWC uses a tpz
∗ = 35 sec, then current value of 70 sec tpz would mean a
predicted loss of DWC 35 seconds into the future.
For alerting, τmod also has limitations. Since tcpa and tpz correspond to distinct physical events, they
can be used directly for prioritizing intruders. The time metric τmod, on the other hand, cannot be used for
this purpose. Figure 4 illustrates a hypothetical encounter involving three non-accelerating intruders with
varying relative horizontal speeds and initial values of tcpa. All three intruders have HMD = 0. Here v ≡ |r˙|
denotes the magnitude of an intruder’s relative velocity vector. The intruders’ initial ranges are v × tcpa.
Therefore, intruders (labeled as Intr in the figure) 1, 2, and 3’s initial ranges are 1.18, 1.78, and 10.42 nmi,
respectively. Without loss of generality, the encounter begins at t = 0 sec. Recall that a higher time metric
value indicates a lower threat. Intruder 1 (Intr 1) has the smallest relative speed v = 50 kts and the largest
intial tcpa, tcpa = 85 sec. Intruder 1 is predicted by tcpa to be the least threat. On the other hand, τmod
predicts intruder 1 to be the highest threat.
One may argue that the time to the Dmod disk serves as a better time metric than tcpa for prioritizing
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Intr 1: tcpa(t = 0) = 85 sec, v = 50 kts
Intr 2: tcpa(t = 0) = 80 sec, v = 80 kts
Intr 3: tcpa(t = 0) = 75 sec, v = 500 kts
Figure 4. τmod ranks intruder threats in reverse order as compared to tcpa in a multi-intruder encounter.
intruders. To test this, consider a protected zone defined by a disk with a radius of Dmod with no additional
buffer zone. Figure 5 illustrates another hypothetical encounter involving three non-accelerating intruders
(different from the previous encounter). All three intruders have HMD = 0. Intruders (labeled as Intr in
the figure) 4, 5, and 6’s initial ranges are 1.04, 2.67, and 11.81 nmi, respectively. Compared to tpz, τmod
predicts the opposite threat level priorities at the start of the encounter, or time zero. Intruder 4 (Intr 4)
has the smallest tpz yet has the largest τmod 104 sec. Moreover, in this encounter, the intruders’ threat level
priorities change with time as the τmod curves intersect. This may be undesirable as it may cause a DAA
system’s directive guidance to reverse direction during a DAA maneuver.
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τ
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Intr 4: tpz(t = 0) = 75 sec, v = 50 kts
Intr 5: tpz(t = 0) = 80 sec, v = 120 kts
Intr 6: tpz(t = 0) = 85 sec, v = 500 kts
Figure 5. τmod ranks intruder threat in reverse order as compared to tpz in a multi-intruder encounter.
IV. Sensitivity to Surveillance Errors
Although tpz has advantages over τmod, its explicit dependency on aircraft velocities makes it likely to
be more sensitive to surveillance errors. Fluctuating values of a time metric around the DAA system’s alert
threshold are undesirable as it may cause the alert type to vary back and forth, posing challenges in providing
a stable, consistent alert display to UAS pilots. Inaccurate values of a time metric may advance or delay the
onset of an alert and impact the performance of the DAA system.
7 of 17
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 N
A
SA
 A
M
ES
 R
ES
EA
RC
H
 C
EN
TE
R 
on
 Ju
ne
 9
, 2
01
7 
| ht
tp:
//a
rc.
aia
a.o
rg 
| D
OI
: 1
0.2
514
/6.
201
7-4
383
 
Two metrics are defined in this work to measure the sensitivities of tpz and τmod to surveillance errors:
• Probability of reversal of a time metric during the progression of an non-accelerating encounter, Pr
• Average absolute error of a time metric as a result of surveillance errors, |∆|avg
Both metrics are equal to zero in the absence of surveillance errors and increase with the magnitude of
surveillance errors.
V. Simulations of Encounters
The sensitivities of the time metrics tpz and τmod to the DAA system’s surveillance sensor errors are com-
pared by analyzing a set of simulated encounters with varying geometry, speeds, and surveillance equipage.
The metric tcpa is not considered here due to its lack of a protected zone. The DAA simulation system uses
true trajectories of the intruder and ownship to compute the true relative trajectories between the aircraft,
the simulated surveillance sensor measurements, and the intruder track statistics estimated from the sim-
ulated surveillance sensor measurements. The sensor errors are simulated using Honeywell’s high fidelity
surveillance sensor models and the intruders’ tracks are estimated using Honeywell’s DAA tracking system.
The Honeywell DAA tracker is a sub-TRL6 (Technology readiness level 6) tracker that is in its own iterative
development cycle. This is one instantiation of the tracker with expected improvements in later versions to
meet the developing DAA requirements and help with better alerting and guidance performance. The data
are then collected and used to compute the time metrics and perform subsequent time metric sensitivity
analysis. A total of 972 encounters are simulated; the parameters are summarized in the encounter test
matrix (see Table 4 in Section VI).
V.A. DAA Simulation System
Figure 6 shows a block diagram of the DAA simulation system. A trajectory generator is used to create the
intruder, ownship, and relative intruder trajectories corresponding to the encounters defined in the encounter
test matrix. The ownship trajectory is sent to the Ownship Navigation System block where the trajectory is
used to provide outputs corresponding to an onboard navigation system. The intruder, ownship, and relative
intruder trajectories are sent to the Surveillance Sensor Models block where sensor models are used to simulate
ADS-B, Mode-S, Mode-C, and air-to-air radar measurements. The surveillance sensor measurements are sent
to the Honeywell Tracking System (HTS). The HTS resolves the surveillance sensor measurements into a
common reference frame, uses the H-Fuze system to estimate the track statistics of the intruder relative
to the ownship, and computes additional track kinematic statistics required for DAA systems. Finally, the
intruder, ownship, and relative intruder trajectories, the ownship navigation solution, and the estimated
intruder track statistics are sent to the Time Metric Analysis block for time metric sensitivity analysis.
The HTS is a multi-intruder aircraft, multi-sensor fusion system that estimates the track statistics of
intruders relative to the ownship.12 The HTS fuses the measurements and statistical information from
surveillance sensors in one framework to track intruder aircraft in three dimensions. The HTS features the
H-Fuze system that performs Data Association, Track Management, and State (or Track) Estimation of
surveillance sensors including ADS-B, TCAS, air-to-air radar, optical systems, and ground based radar.
In this encounter trade study, the HTS uses a set of surveillance sensors that includes ADS-B, active
surveillance of Mode-S and Mode-C, and air-to-air radar to track intruders. In general, ADS-B sensors pro-
vide accurate latitude and longitude measurements and accurate North-South and East-West velocity mea-
surements. Active surveillance sensors provide accurate range measurements, noisy bearing measurements
and no velocity measurements. Air-to-air radar provides range measurements with comparable accuracy
to active surveillance range measurements and bearing measurements more accurate than active surveil-
lance bearing measurements. Furthermore, air-to-air radar provides North-South and East-West velocity
measurements less accurate than ADS-B.
Table 2 summarizes the key surveillance sensor parameters used in the encounter trade studies. Note
that these parameters were tuned and verified using flight test data.18,19 The sensor’s fields of view are
specified using maximum range (R), bearing (B), and elevation (E). The bearing is defined with respect
the line pointed to by the ownship’s nose (right is positive). The sensors position errors are specified using
latitude, longitude, and altitude for ADS-B; range and bearing for Mode-S and Mode-C; and range, bearing,
and elevation for air-to-air radar. The sensor’s velocity errors are specified using North (N), East (E), and
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Figure 6. Block diagram illustrating the data flow during the simulation of encounters.
Down (D) for both ADS-B and the air-to-air radar. Mode S and Mode C sensors do not output velocities.
Note that the Mode-C range field of view is dependent on the intruders bearing relative to the ownship.
Further, note that the Mode-S and Mode-C bearing errors are dependent on the elevation of the intruder
relative to the ownship.
Table 2. Key sensor parameters
Type
Field of View Position Error Velocity Error
[R(nmi), B(deg), E(deg)] [lat(deg), lon(deg), alt(m)] [N(m/s), E(m/s), D(m/s)]
or [R(m), B(deg), E(deg)]
ADS-B [90, 180, 90] [2, 2, 6.5] [2, 2, 0.5]
Mode S [30, 180, 20] [15 or 9a or 5b, -]
Mode C [14c 9d or 5e, 180, 20] [15, 9f or 15g, -]
Radar [13, 135, 20] [10, 0.4, 0.4] [4, 4, 4]
V.B. Surveillance-Dependent Protected Zone
For DAA alerting criteria, it is desirable to augment the disk-shaped protected zone with a buffer zone. This
additional buffer compensates for surveillance errors and reduces fluctuation of alerts. Surveillance errors
vary with the sensor type as well as the intruder’s relative range and velocity from the ownship. Therefore,
the dimensions of the additional buffer zone can potentially be a function of not just the sensor type, but
also of other parameters such as the intruder’s range, speed, and time to CPA.
awhen elevation is within ±10◦
bwhen elevation is outside ±10◦
cwhen bearing is within ±45◦
dwhen bearing is between ±45◦ and ±135◦
ewhen bearing is outside ±135◦
fwhen elevation is within ±10◦
gwhen elevation is outside ±10◦
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A related consideration is the HMD threshold. For an alerting algorithm that uses an HMD threshold, it
seems logical to define an HMD threshold at the edge of the protected zone at y = 0. If the protected zone
incorporates the HMD in the buffer zone and the HMD threshold is defined appropriately, then the alerting
algorithm can provide consistent raw alerts during the progression of an encounter that would lead to a loss
of DWC. The choice of the protected zone, as well as the HMD threshold, plays an important factor in a
trade-off between missed/late alerts and false alerts.
A conceptually attractive approach is to allow a dynamic protected zone that is a function of the aircraft’s
estimated tracks as well as surveillance errors. However, in this approach, tpz would no longer be linear with
time, and the dimensions of the buffer zone would be a function of encounter geometry and additional sensor
parameters. Therefore, estimated tracks are not considered here for defining the protected zone.
This work defines the protected zone such that most of the HMD fluctuations due to surveillance errors
during an encounter that would lead to loss of DWC fall within the protected zone. To do so, the HMD error
for an intruder is estimated at a characteristic range, Rc, from the ownship, with a characteristic intruder
closure rate, vc. Honeywell sensor model parameters are used for estimating the HMD error. The protected
zone is defined by choosing ∆H to be the estimated HMD error.
For ADS-B, the HMD error arising from range measurement error is independent of range (i.e., a constant
error). The HMD error arising from velocity measurement error is proportional to range.
σH, ADS-B
2 ≈ σp. ADS-B2 +
(
Rc σv, ADS-B
vc
)2
, (5)
where σp. ADS-B is the position measurement standand deviation and σv, ADS-B is the velocity measurement
standard deviation. For active surveillance, Mode-S or Mode-C,
σH, MODE-S/C
2 ≈ (Rc σb, MODE-S/C)2 , (6)
where σb, MODE-S/C is the bearing standard deviation of the Mode-S or Mode-C measurement. For radar,
σH, RADAR
2 ≈ Rc2 ∗
(
σb, RADAR
2 +
σv, RADAR
2
vc2
)
, (7)
where σb, RADAR and σv, RADAR are the bearing and speed standard deviations of the radar measurement,
respectively.
The final value of ∆H
0, the superscript denoting a benchmark value, is a function of the combination of
sensors,
1(
∆H
0
)2 = Σ 1σH, sensor2 (8)
Table 3 lists the sensor error parameters used for estimating the HMD error and the resulting buffer zone
size parameters, ∆H
0. Note that the values in parentheses for ∆H
0 are computed from Eq. 8, and the values
before the parentheses are the values actually used in the simulations.
V.C. Encounter Test Matrix
The encounter test matrix for the set of encounters is designed to sample various surveillance equipages,
relative speeds, HMDs, relative altitudes, and relative headings. The encounters are intended to cover a
wide range of representive parameters but not to model a distribution of encounters.
The methodology for selecting representative intruder equipage types is as follows. The air-to-air radar
detects all intruding aircraft as they enter the radar’s field of view, subject to the radar’s probability of
detection. Some intruders are equipped with ADS-B out and are, therefore, detectable by the ownship’s
ADS-B sensor. The FAA has mandated that, by 2020, all all aircraft operating above 10,000 ft mean sea
level (MSL) must be equipped with ADS-B out.20 Many of the ADS-B out equipped aircraft will also be
equipped with a Mode S transponder. Aircraft not equipped with ADS-B may have a Mode S transponder,
a Mode C transponder, or no transponder at all. In this work, intruders are categorized by their equipage
types in the following way:
• ADS-B out: intruder is detectable by ADS-B and radar.
• Mode S: intruder is detectable by Mode S and radar.
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Table 3. Buffer zone parameters and the sensor error parameters used for estimation
Parameter Value Unit
Rc 5 nmi
vc 100 kts
σp, ADS-B 2 m
σv, ADS-B 2 m/s
σb, MODE-S/C 9 deg
σb, RADAR 0.4 deg
σv, RADAR 4 m/s
σH, ADSB 960 ft
σH, MODE-S/C 3880 ft
σH, RADAR 1930 ft
∆H, ADS-B
0 900(860) ft
∆H, MODE-S/C
0 1700(1730) ft
∆H, RADAR
0 1900(1930) ft
• Mode C: intruder is detectable by Mode C and radar.
• No equipage: intruder is detectable by radar.
Table 4 lists the independent parameters of an encounter defined by the test matrix. The relative speed,
altitude, and heading are with respect to the ownship. A relative heading of zero degrees represents a head-
on encounter in which the two aircraft are flying towards each other. Passing in front (behind) means the
intruder passes in front of (behind) the ownship. The test matrix defines a total of 972 encounters.
Table 4. Parameters of the test matrix
Parameter Value
Intruder Equipage ADS-B, Mode S, Mode C, None
Relative Speed (kts) 100, 300, 500
HMD (ft) 0, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000
Relative Altitude (ft) -500, 0, 500
Relative Heading (deg) 0, 45, 90
Passing in front, behind (if HMD 6= 0)
For each encounter, the two time metrics, τmod and tpz, are computed as follows:
• Kinematics: both the true and estimated ownship navigation solutions and intruder tracks; and
• Protected Zone: using Dmod disk and protected zone parameterized by a scaling factor, ∆H/∆H0, that
scales the benchmark HMD error ∆H
0 by 0, 1, 2, and 3. Note that Dmod = R0 +∆H and R0 = 4000 ft.
The reason that Dmod is set to R0 + ∆H is because the HMD threshold should be the same as Dmod to
avoid oscillating alerts.21
V.D. Encounter Setup
For each simulated encounter, the ownship is fixed at a specific position and the intruder’s initial kinematics
are constructed according to the encounter test matrix parameters shown in Table 4, with an initial tcpa =
4 minutes. The intruder trajectories all fly a constant velocity. For analysis of each encounter, both the
estimated and true time metrics are computed for tracks with tcpa < 2 minutes. The two minute time
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window is appropriate for DAA alerts. The time metrics tpz and τmod are computed for every intruder track
estimated by the tracker and the ownship navigation solution with navigation noise. The true time metrics,
tpz
0 and τmod
0, are computed using the true trajectories.
The probability of time reversal, Pr, is calculated from Eq. 9:
Pr =
occurrences of increasing time metric in consecutive tracks
total number of consecutive tracks
(9)
The average absolute error of a time metric is calculated by averaging the absolute difference between a
computed time metric (from the noisy tracks) and its true value (from the true tracks) over the two minute
window of the encounter:
|∆|avg = Σ|tpz − tpz
0| or Σ|τmod − τmod0|
total number of tracks
, (10)
where the superscript 0 denotes a time metric computed from the true tracks.
An additional metric, P (HMD ≤ HMD∗), calculates the percentage of noisy tracks that result in an
HMD within the HMD threshold, HMD∗ = R0 + ∆H . If the protected zone is wide enough to accommodate
HMD errors, this metric should be close to 1.
VI. Simulation Results
Figure 7 shows results aggregated over all encounters of Pr, |∆|avg, and P (HMD ≤ HMD∗) at various
degrees of extended protected zone, parameterized by the scaling factor ∆H/∆H
0. The general trend is
that both Pr and |∆|avg decrease as ∆H increases. The Pr and |∆|avg differences between tpz and τmod
are greatest at ∆H/∆H
0 = 0, i.e., no additional buffer zone. Values of Pr are higher for tpz than for
τmod by 14%(∆H/∆H
0 = 1)-50%(∆H/∆H
0 = 0). Values of |∆|avg are higher for tpz than for τmod by
5%(∆H/∆H
0 = 1)-33%(∆H/∆H
0 = 0).
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Figure 7. Results of aggregate Pr, |∆|avg, and P (HMD ≤ HMD∗).
While the performance of tpz is slightly worse than τmod, the differences may not be significant enough to
degrade the DAA system’s alerting performance, especially when ∆H/∆H
0 = 1. In the following paragraphs,
only results for ∆H/∆H
0 = 1 are discussed in more detail.
12 of 17
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 N
A
SA
 A
M
ES
 R
ES
EA
RC
H
 C
EN
TE
R 
on
 Ju
ne
 9
, 2
01
7 
| ht
tp:
//a
rc.
aia
a.o
rg 
| D
OI
: 1
0.2
514
/6.
201
7-4
383
 
The two sensitivity metrics are highly positively correlated as both increase with the standard deviation
of the surveillance errors. Figure 8 shows values of the two metrics for all 972 encounters. The same trends
are observed for both metrics in various categories of encounters. Therefore, the following discussion will
focus on Pr only.
Pr(tpz)
|∆|avg(tpz) (sec)Avg. Abs. Error of tpz (sec)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
Pr(τmod)
|∆|avg(τmod) (sec)Avg. Abs. Error of ?mod (sec)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
Figure 8. Correlation between Pr (vertical) and |∆|avg (horizontal, seconds).
Figure 9 shows the probability of reversal, Pr, categorized by an intruder’s relative speed. For both tpz
and τmod, Pr decreases noticeably as the relative speed increases. This trend can be explained as follows.
The error of tpz and τmod can be roughly estimated by
δt ≈ −t
(σr
r
+
σr˙
r˙
)
, (11)
where σr and σr˙ represent standard deviations of r and r˙, respectively, corresponding to surveillance errors.
All four sensors provide very accurate range measurements, and the range error therefore contributes much
less than the speed error to the time error. The standard deviation of the speed error in both ADS-B and
radar models is not a function of velocity. Therefore, the speed error term on the right side of Eq. 11 is
inversely proportional to the magnitude of r˙, and therefore is largest when the relative speed itself is small.
A secondary contribution to this trend, although to a lesser extent, is the effect of the sensor’s field of
view. In high relative speed encounters, the intruder does not enter the sensor’s field of view at tcpa = 120
seconds but at later times in the encounter. Since the time metric error decreases as the intruder nears the
ownship, the later measurement availability lowers the average time metric error.
100 300 500
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
Pr(τmod)
Pr(tpz)
Figure 9. Values of Pr for each relative speed
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Comparing tpz results to τmod results in Figure 9, tpz results in slightly larger median values (the line
within the box) at every relative speed.
Figure 10 shows the probability of reversal, Pr, categorized by intruder equipage. Comparing tpz results
across categories, intruders with ADS-B out result in the smallest median value of Pr and intruders without
any equipage result in the largest median value, approximately 30% greater than the smallest median value.
The metric τmod results display the same trend as the tpz results. Comparing tpz results to τmod results, tpz
leads to a slightly larger median value in every equipage category.
Equipage
ADS-B Mode S Mode C No Equipage
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Pr(τmod)
Pr(tpz)
Figure 10. Values of Pr for each intruder equipage category.
Figure 11 shows the probability of reversal categorized by planned HMDs. The probability Pr(tpz)
increases with HMD, reaching a larger median value and broader distribution at HMD = 4000 ft. This is
because the surface of the Protected Zone becomes “steeper” near 4000 ft (see Figure 2) and causes tpz to
be more sensitive to HMD errors. On the other hand, Pr distribtions for τmod are fairly stable across the
HMD categories.
HMD (ft)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Pr(τmod)
Pr(tpz)
Figure 11. Values of Pr for each value of planned HMD.
The value of Pr shows little variation with relative altitude, relative heading, and the passing direction.
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VII. Conclusions
A new time metric called Time to Protected Zone is proposed for use in UAS’s Detect and Avoid (DAA)
systems. This time metric, denoted as tpz, has three advantages over the currently adopted modified tau, or
τmod. It corresponds to a well-defined physical event, it is linear with the real time during the progression
of an encounter, and it can be used directly to prioritize intruders. When used for defining a Well Clear,
tpz addresses several limitations of τmod. For alerting, tpz can be used directly for intruder prioritization
while τmod is limited by its lack of physical interpretation. For alerting, the protected zone can be defined
to be a function of surveillance errors for detecting intruding aircraft to provide potentially better alerting
performance.
To quantify the sensitivity of tpz to surveillance errors, simulations of encounters using realistic sensor and
tracker models are performed. Results show that, with adequately selected protected zones, the sensitivity of
tpz to surveillance errors is comparable to that of τmod. The slight increase of time reversal rates and average
time errors by using tpz is likely not enough to impact the alerting performance of a DAA system. Therefore,
the choice of tpz over τmod has advantages and no obvious downside, at least not at a fundamental level.
Nonetheless, additional simulations such as MIT Lincoln Lab’s encounter models22 or NASA’s NAS-wide
simultions23 that capture a wider variety as well as the statistical nature of encounters must be performed
in order to assess the overall performance of tpz.
Appendix: Computation of tpz and Its Relation to τmod
This section derives the formulas used for computing tcpa, HMD, τmod, and tpz. The formulas for τmod
and tpz are compared to show that, when R0 = Dmod, tpz ≤ τmod at all times of the encounter.
Consider an encounter in which an intruder approaches the ownship. By definition,
r˙ ≡ dr
dt
. (A.1)
The scalar horizontal range r and range rate r˙ are defined as
r ≡ |r|
r˙ ≡ drdt = r·r˙r
(A.2)
For a closing geometry, r˙ < 0 and r · r˙ < 0. Let r, r˙, r and r˙ represent the values at t = 0, or the beginning of
an encounter. The time metric tcpa is the time at which the predicted r, using constant-velocity trajectories,
reaches a minimum. Therefore,
(r + tcpar˙) · r˙ = 0, and (A.3a)
tcpa = −r · r˙
r˙ · r˙ . (A.3b)
If r˙ ≤ 0, tcpa can be conveniently defined to be 0. The HMD is, by definition, the horizontal distance
between the intruder and the ownship at tcpa.
HMD ≡ |r + tcpar˙| (A.4)
Taking the square of both sides of Eq. A.4 and substituting Eq. A.3 for tcpa:
HMD2 = r · r− (r · r˙)
2
r˙ · r˙ . (A.5)
Eq. A.5 can be rearranged to derive an expression for r · r˙, valid when r ≥ HMD,
r · r˙ = −|r˙|
√
r2 −HMD2, (A.6)
where the negative sign indicates a closing geometry.
The time metric tpz is defined as the predicted time for the intruder to reach the protected zone. If
the predicted trajectory does not intercept the protected zone, then tpz = tcpa. By Eq. (2), it is clear that
tpz ≤ tcpa.
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The following paragraphs prove that,
tpz ≤ τmod when R0 = Dmod. (A.7)
The additional buffer zone decreases tpz because the resulting protected zone has dimensions larger than the
disk of radius R0. Therefore, it suffices to prove that Eq. A.7 holds when the protected zone is a disk.
When r ≤ Dmod, both tpz and τmod are zero and, therefore, Eq. A.7 holds because the intruder is already
in the protected zone. When r > Dmod, rewrite τmod as a distance divided by the relative speed, |r˙|:
τmod = −r
2 −Dmod2
rr˙
=
1
|r˙|
[
−r
2 −Dmod2
r · (r˙/|r˙|)
]
=
1
|r˙|
[
r2 −Dmod2√
r2 −HMD2
]
(A.8)
where Eqs. A.2 and A.6 are used to derive Eq. A.8. Similarly, rewrite tpz in Eq. 2 as a distance divided by
the relative speed, |r˙|, to become
tpz = − r·r˙r˙·r˙ −
√
max
(
0,Dmod2−HMD2
)
|r˙|
= 1|r˙|
[√
r2 −HMD2 −
√
max
(
0, Dmod
2 −HMD2)] (A.9)
Subtracting Eq. A.9 from Eq. A.8 results in
τmod − tpz = 1|r˙|
[
−Dmod
2 −HMD2√
r2 −HMD2
+
√
max
(
0, Dmod
2 −HMD2)] . (A.10)
When HMD ≤ Dmod,
τmod − tpz = 1|r˙|
[
−Dmod2−HMD2√
r2−HMD2
+
√
Dmod
2 −HMD2
]
≥ 1|r˙|
[
− Dmod2−HMD2√
Dmod2−HMD2
+
√
Dmod
2 −HMD2
]
= 0.
(A.11)
When HMD > Dmod, the second term on the right hand side of Eq. A.10 is zero and
τmod − tpz = 1|r˙|
[
−Dmod2−HMD2√
r2−HMD2
]
> 0, (A.12)
hence the proof of Eq. A.7 is completed.
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